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Abstract
INFerence-as-a-Service (INFaaS) in the cloud
has enabled the prevalent use of Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) in home automation, targeted
advertising, machine vision, etc. The cloud
receives the inference request as a raw input,
containing a rich set of private information, that
can be misused or leaked, possibly inadvertently.
This prevalent setting can compromise the privacy
of users during the inference phase. This paper
sets out to provide a principled approach, dubbed
Cloak, that finds optimal stochastic perturbations
to obfuscate the private data before it is sent to the
cloud. To this end, Cloak reduces the information
content of the transmitted data while conserving
the essential pieces that enable the request to be
serviced accurately. The key idea is formulating
the discovery of this stochasticity as an offline
gradient-based optimization problem that reformu-
lates a pre-trained DNN (with optimized known
weights) as an analytical function of the stochastic
perturbations. Using Laplace distribution as a
parametric model for the stochastic perturbations,
Cloak learns the optimal parameters using
gradient descent and Monte Carlo sampling. This
set of optimized Laplace distributions further
guarantee that the injected stochasticity satisfies
the -differential privacy criterion. Experimental
evaluations with real-world datasets show that, on
average, the injected stochasticity can reduce the
information content in the input data by 80.07%,
while incurring 7.12% accuracy loss.
1. Introduction
The success of deep learning in many areas including vision,
recommendation systems, natural language processing,
etc., has heralded the adoption of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in production systems (Laine et al., 2017; Ke¨puska
& Bohouta, 2018). However, the computational complexity
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of DNNs has pushed their execution to mostly cloud
infrastructure, where an edge device on the user side captures
and sends the raw inputs (requests) to the cloud for inference.
This execution model, called INFerence-as-a-Service
(INFaaS) (Soifer et al., 2019; La et al., 2015), has become
de-facto (e.g., mobile phones), yet it poses serious privacy
concerns (Shokri et al., 2017; Warzel, 2019).
The threat is that as soon as the raw data is sent to the cloud,
it can be misused or leaked through security vulnerabilities
even if the cloud provider and/or the communication link
is trusted (Kocher et al., 2019; Thompson & Warzel, 2019;
Lipp et al., 2018; Newcomb, 2018). Such a risk is present for
every single request (input) and is exacerbated by the fact that
the raw inputs contains a rich set of information that is not di-
rectly relevant to the inference task. This paper aims to devise
Cloak, a systematic approach towards providing a differen-
tially private inference mechanism by adding perturbations to
the primary input (request). An unprincipled addition of per-
turbations will lead to significant loss in the inference accu-
racy, putting the service in the position of questionable utility.
To address these challenges, the proposed key idea is
formulating the discovery of the perturbation as an offline
gradient-based optimization problem that reformulates a
pre-trained DNN (with optimized known weights) as an
analytical function of the stochastic perturbations. Using
Laplace distribution as a parametric model for the stochastic
perturbations, Cloak learns the optimal parameters using
gradient descent and Monte Carlo sampling. With this setup,
these learned distributions can obfuscate the private data
while retaining the cloud’s ability to perform the inference
task. This set of optimized Laplace distributions further guar-
antee that the learned perturbations meet the -differential
privacy criterion. To meet  (the desired privacy budget), we
incorporate it as a hard constraint in Cloak’s loss function to
maximize the accuracy with respect to this constraint. Cloak
takes a further step after achieving the highest accuracy for a
given  and explores an alternative space by reducing Mutual
Information (MI) between the original input and its perturbed
representation. This approach opens a trade-off between
accuracy and information content of the perturbed input that
is controlled using a Lagrange multiplier that acts as a knob.
It worth emphasizing that Cloak’s learning process is offline
and is not invoked during inference. For each inference
request, a distinct random perturbation tensor is sampled
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from the learned distributions and is added to the raw input.
Cloak offers these capabilities with a stark contrast with
recently emerging line of work on using noise for inference
privacy that require to know what they are protecting against
(i.e., a private label). Cloak, however, does not need this extra
labeling and it attempts at removing any excessive informa-
tion that is not conducive to the main inference task/label.
Additionally, unlike these techniques, Cloak does not need
to change parameters or the architecture of the pre-trained
networks. Instead, it produces a significantly perturbed rep-
resentation of the input, aiming to only provide just enough
information to serve the inference task (Figure 1). Further-
more, the aforementioned prior works do not directly learn
the perturbations (Author, 2020; Osia et al., 2020; Osia et al.,
2020; Wang et al., 2018). Finally, Cloak does not impose the
prohibitive computational cost of techniques that use homo-
morphic encryption (Dowlin et al., 2016; Gentry, 2009; Bos
et al., 2013) which can increase the execution time of a neural
network by three orders of magnitude (Riazi et al., 2019).
We provide an analytical formulation of the stochasticity
learning problem as a constrained convex optimization
program that maximizes the privacy by minimizing the
mutual information between the raw input and the data
sent to the cloud subject to a restriction on the degradation
of the DNN utility (accuracy). Cloak’s objective function
and the constraint both depend on the prior distribution
of the perturbation. However, for a fixed parameterized
family of distributions and a fixed value of the Lagrange
multiplier knob, the problem has a unique global optima.
The convexity of the formulation guarantees that the gradient
descent will converge to that global optima. This proves that
Cloak maximizes the privacy under the utility preserving
constraint. Further, we prove Cloak satisfies differential
privacy guarantees with respect to the features of the input.
The per-feature guarantee ensures that an adversary cannot
use the spatio-temporal correlations to reverse engineer the
process and gain access to the sensitive information.
Experimental evaluation with real-world datasets of UTK-
Face (Zhang & Qi, 2017), CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky, 2009),
and MNIST (LeCun & Cortes) shows that Cloak can reduce
the mutual information content of input images by 80.07%
with accuracy loss of 7.12% for an  of 2.5. The large dimen-
sions of images in the CelebA dataset prevent the accurate
estimation of mutual information. As such, we take a prac-
tical approach towards evaluation of this dataset. First, we
visualize the effects of Cloak pictorially on Figure 1. Then,
we select the inference service as “smile detection” on this
dataset. The results show that Cloak reduces the accuracy of
a malevolent DNN classifier that aims to infer “gender,” from
96.7% to 65.7%–reduction of 31.0%. This significant reduc-
tion is achieved while Cloak does not assume or incorporate
anything about the label, feature, or sensitivity (privacy)
of “gender.” Additionally, Cloak preserves the accuracy
of “smile detection” service at 87.2%–only 4.9% accuracy
degradation. The code for the experiments is included in
the submission and all the hyperparameters and experiment
details are provided in the supplementary material.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the notation and fundamental
concepts used in the rest of the paper. We first review
differential privacy and the Laplace mechanism, which is an
-differentially private mechanism that Cloak is built upon.
Then, we briefly review mutual information formulation,
that is another conventional measure for privacy and is also
used in this paper.
2.1. Function Notations
We define function f , to be the target function the output of
which is to be perturbed. This could be any pre-processing
(e.g., normalization) carried out on the raw input data, before
being handed to the untrusted party. In particular, this func-
tion can be the identity function if there is no pre-processing
steps. We also define function g to be the neural network
computation which is to be executed by the untrusted party.
2.2. Differential Privacy
Definition 2.1. -Differential Privacy (-DP). For  ≥ 0,
an algorithmA satisfies -DP (Dwork et al., 2006a;b) if and
only if for any pair of datasetsD andD′ that differ in only
one element:
P[A(D)= t]≤eP[A(D′)= t] ∀t (1)
where, P[A(D) = t] denotes the probability that the algo-
rithm A outputs t. DP tries to approximate the effect of an
individual opting out of contributing to the dataset, by ensur-
ing that any effect due to the inclusion of one’s data is small.
2.3. Laplace Mechanism
Definition 2.2. Laplace Mechanism. (Dwork et al.,
2006b) Given a target function f and a fixed  ≥ 0, the
randomizing algorithm Af (D) = f(D) + x where x is
a perturbation random variable drawn from a Laplace
distribution Lap(µ,∆f ), is called the Laplace Mechanism
and is -DP. Here, ∆f is the global sensitivity of function
f , and is defined as ∆f = sup|f(D)−f(D′)| over the all
dataset pairs (D,D′) that differ in only one element.
2.4. Mutual Information
The amount of mutual information between the raw data
and the representation that is to be publicized is another
measure of privacy that is widely used in literature (Cuff &
Yu, 2016; Kalantari et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2017). Cloak
aims to minimize the mutual information between the raw
input (D) and its perturbed representation,Af (D), that was
attained via the randomization algorithmAf . We can bound
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(a) Original Image (b) B¯=0.44 (c) B¯=1.01 (d) B¯=1.70 (e) B¯=1.95
Figure 1. Visualizing the effect of Cloak on the input images as we increase the average scale of perturbations B¯ that is proportional to
the standard deviation. The non-sensitive classification task is smile detection. The first row shows the heat map of perturbation scales
for each pixel. At higher scales, Cloak obfuscates the features that are non-conducive to the smile detection task e.g. the background,
the hair, etc., while only the lips and some minor facial attributes are recognizable.
this mutual information by
I(D;Af (D))≤I(f(D);Af (D))
=H(Af (D))−H(Af (D)|f(D))
=H(Af (D))−H(x)
≤H(f(D))−H(x)
=H(f(D))−log(2be)
(2)
where, H(·) represents the Shannon entropy (Shannon,
1948). Here, we assume x is distributed as Lap(µ,b), i.e.,
b is the scale of the Laplace distribution. The first inequality
follows from the data processing inequality (Beaudry &
Renner, 2011). The first term in the last line of Equation (2)
depends on the target function f and is a constant with respect
to the optimization variable x in our case. Hence, we do
not consider it for our optimization. The second term can be
written as−log(2be)=−log(2e)−log(b), where−log(2e)
is constant. Thus, If we minimize−log(b), i.e., maximize the
scale of the distribution of perturbations, we have minimized
an upper bound on the mutual information of the leaked data.
3. Offline Training for Perturbed Inference
During the inference phase, for each input data tensor (D),
Cloak adds a distinct randomly generated perturbation
tensor (X). This addition yields a perturbed representation
of the input that is sent out to the cloud for classification
with the DNN denoted by g. During the inference phase
no optimization is performed. X is generated by sampling
each element, x, independently, from a Laplace distribution
Lap(µ,b), where µ and b are the corresponding elements of
the locations (M) and scales tensors ( B).
In a separate offline process, Cloak finds these M and B
tensors by solving an optimization problem. Cloak trains
the locations and scales tensors in such a way that: (1)
provides the required differential privacy guarantee, as
defined shortly; (2) incurs minimum degradation to the
neural network’s objective, and, (3) decreases the amount
of mutual information between the original tensor D and its
noisy, perturbed version,Af (D). When the desired tensors
M and B are found, they are used for perturbing input data for
inference, in deployed neural networks as mentioned above.
This section first defines an instantiation of differential
privacy, called feature differential privacy, that applies to
our problem setup. The section continues on to discuss the
constraints that need to be applied to the locations and scales
tensors to meet the required guarantee and related privacy
consideration. Finally, this section explain the workflow in
details and provide a proof that the proposed mechanism is
-feature differentially private.
3.1. -Feature Differential Privacy
The goal of differential privacy is to guarantee that one
cannot infer whether an individual data instance was in
the dataset by observing an algorithm’s output. In Cloak’s
problem setting, we apply differential privacy to obfuscate
personal/sensitive features, within each data instance. This
problem can be looked upon as trying to make the changes
in one feature within the data instance indistinguishable.
As such, we define an instantiation of differential privacy,
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where a data instance is considered as a dataset and features
are considered records of this dataset, as feature differential
privacy. For instance, in images, the features can be the
pixels, and one attempt at protecting sensitive information
in the image could be adding noise through a deferentially
private mechanism, so as to make pixels less distinguishable.
In this case, the datasets D and D′ can be two identical
images that only differ in one pixel.
3.2. Noise Parameter Constraints
Cloak aims at casting the noise distribution parameters as
a trainable tensor, and using conventional gradient based
methods to train them. To be able to define gradients over
the locations and scales, we rewrite the noise sampling to be
X=B◦E+M, instead of X∼Lap(M,B), where E is a tensor
with the same shape as the data tensor (D) and is sampled
i.i.d fromLap(0,1) and ◦ is the element-wise multiplication.
This redefinition enables us to formulate the problem as an
analytical function for which we can calculate the gradients.
To achieve the differential privacy guarantee, the elements
of B must be larger than ∆f . We define a to-be-tuned
hyper-parameterMx as an upper bound and reparameterize
the scales tensor B as P:
B=
1.0+tanh(P)
2
(Mx−∆f

)+
∆f

(3)
As discussed experimentally later,Mx is usually between 1.5
to 2.5. We put this extra constraint on the distributions, so that
none of the noise elements gets a very high scale and becomes
an outlier compared to the scale of other noise elements.
3.3. Average and Worst-Case Privacy Considerations
Differential privacy offers a worst-case privacy guarantee.
Cloak, however, decreases the mutual information between
the input data and its perturbed representation, while main-
taining the desired differential privacy guarantee. The reduc-
tion in mutual information can be considered as an average-
case privacy measure (Huang et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2017).
As discussed, the mutual information between tensors D
and Af (D) where the latter is acquired by injecting noise
to f(D), is proportional to the log of the standard deviation
of the noise that is added to each feature (element) in f(D).
Therefore, Cloak needs to maximize the scales of the noise
distributions to minimize the leaked mutual information.
Increasing the scale parameters of noise elements through
training must be done in consideration of the neural
network’s objective. For instance, in a setting where the task
is smile detection, some facial features like the mouth are
conducive to this detection. Other features, however, such
as that person’s hair, the background, their eye color, etc.
are irrelevant. Thus, adding more noise to these features can
achieve higher privacy in terms of information loss, while
incurring minimum degradation to the utility.
An example of noise injection can be seen in Figure 1, where
the effect of increase in the average of the noise scales is
illustrated for two sample images from the CelebA (Liu
et al., 2015) dataset. In this illustration, Cloak causes non-
conducive features to get blurry by increasing the scales. For
the rightmost images, only the smile and some minor facial at-
tributes are present. For instance, notice the second example
image where the other person in the background fades away
as the noise increases. The mean accuracy drop over the test
portion of the dataset for the four perturbation distribution
sets (four sets of tensors B and M) in this Figure are 3.4%,
3.7%, 4.5% and 12.7% respectively, with standard deviations
in the 0.12%−0.68% range. The privacy budget () is 2.5.
Such a rather targeted (non-uniform) obfuscation behavior
that leads to low degradation in accuracy for a given 
is the result of our formulation that incorporates mutual
information in Cloak’s loss function (see Section 3.4). If
only the differential privacy constraint was considered, the
noise would have just been increased uniformly across the
image and accuracy loss would have been much higher. This
behavior will be discussed in more details in Section 4.2.
3.4. Optimization Problem Formulation
Cloak’s objective function is to minimize the mutual infor-
mation (or maximize the noise variance as discussed before)
subject to a bounded degradation in the neural network’s
utility. Using Lagrange multiplier λ and given our reparam-
eterization of B, we can express the loss function of Cloak as
L(M,B)=−logB+λLnn(M,B) (4)
where, Lnn represents the utility loss function of
the neural network. For instance, in the case of C-
class classification, this utility can be represented as
Lnn(M,B) =− 1n
∑n
i=1
∑C
c=1y
i
c log(p
i
c), which is the cross
entropy loss, where pic is the i
th Monte Carlo sample (Kalos
& Whitlock, 1986) of the probability the neural network has
assigned to observation i belonging to class c, and, yic is the
indicator function of whether the ith sample belongs to the
class c. Converting the averaging over n samples into the
population expectation, we can rewrite our loss function as
L(M,B)=−logB
+λEX∼L(M,B)
[ C∑
c=1
yclog
(
g
(
f(D)+X
)
c
)] (5)
We take sufficiently largen noise samples drawn from the cur-
rent locations and scales tensors to approximate the second
term. This means that to apply a single update to the trainable
parameters, Cloak runs multiple forward passes on the en-
tire neural network, at each pass draws new samples for the
noise (perturbation) tensor, and averages over the losses and
applies the update using the average. However, in practice, if
mini-batch training is used, we observed that using only a sin-
gle noise sample for each update can yield desirable results,
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Algorithm 1 Cloak’s Perturbation Training Workflow
Input: D, y, f , , λ
Initialize M=0, P=−∞ andMx> ∆f
repeat
Sample E∼Lap(0,1)
Let B= 1.0+tanh(P)2 (Mx−∆f )+ ∆f
Let X=B◦E+M
Take gradient step on M and P from Equation (4)
until Algorithm converges
Return: M, B
since a new noise tensor is sampled for each mini-batch.
The parameter λ is the knob, which could be tuned to reflect
whether we want to trade-off accuracy for information
degradation (more privacy), or vice versa. We name the
−logB, the mutual information decay term. One important
feature of Cloak is that it does not need access to sensitive
information/labels. In other words, it does not need to be
given specific information about what it is protecting against,
it only needs access to the non-sensitive labels of the main
task, and it tries to remove any extra information with the
trained perturbations. For more details of the optimization
problem please refer to the supplementary material.
3.5. Cloak’s Workflow
Cloak’s optimization process can be seen in Algorithm 1.
Before beginning the process, the locations tensor (M) is
initialized to 0, and tensor P is initialized in such a way that
the scales take the (∆f ) value. The rest of the parameters
of the neural network are set to their pre-trained values. The
functions f and g are the target function and neural network
function, as defined in Section 2.1.
Once the training is finished, the optimized locations and
scales are saved. During deployment (inference), for
each input that is supposed to be given to the inference
service, a set of perturbations is sampled from the optimized
distributions. Each element in the perturbations tensor X
is sampled independently and added to input before it is
uploaded for inference.
3.6. Differential Privacy Proof
In this section we show that Cloak is -feature Differentially
Private (DP), as defined in Section 3.1. We start by showing
Cloak is -DP with respect to a single feature. We then show
that Cloak is -feature DP, with respect to all features.
Proposition 3.1. Cloak is -DP w.r.t. a single feature.
Proof. For a single feature Di in the dataset D, we have
Af (Di)=f(Di)+Xi, where Xi is drawn fromLap(Mi,Bi).
This is a Laplace Mechanism and hence it is -DP.
Proposition 3.2. Cloak is -feature differentially private
with respect to all features.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, each single feature i is i-DP
for some i ≥ 0. Assume D and D′ are two datasets that
are different only on jth feature. Since Cloak samples each
noise perturbation independently, we have
P[Af (D)= t]=
∏
i
P[Ai(Di)= ti]
=P[Aj(D′j)= tj ]
∏
i 6=j
P[Ai(D′i)= ti]
≤ejP[Aj(D′j)= tj ]
∏
i6=j
P[Ai(D′i)= ti]
≤emax(i)P[A(D′)= t].
Hence, Cloak is -feature DP with respect to all features.
4. Experimental Results
To evaluate Cloak, we use four real-world datasets on four
DNNs. Namely, we use VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman,
2014) on CelebA (Liu et al., 2015), AlexNet (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) on CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky, 2009), a modified
version of VGG-16 model on UTKFace (Zhang & Qi, 2017),
and LeNet-5 (LeCun, 1998) on MNIST (LeCun & Cortes).
We define a set of non-sensitive tasks as inference services
over these datasets. Specifically, we use smile detection on
CelebA, the 20 super-class classification on CIFAR-100,
and gender detection on UTKFace. For MNIST, we use a
classifier that detects if the input is greater than five. The
pre-trained accuracy of the networks for smile detection,
super-class classification, gender detection and greater
than five detection are 91.8%, 55.7%, 87.87% and 99.29%.
The accuracy numbers reported in this section are all on a
held-out test set, which has not been seen during training
by the neural networks. For Cloak results, since the output
is not deterministic, we repeatedly run the inference ten
times on the test set with the batch size of one and report
the mean accuracy. Since the standard deviation of the
accuracy numbers is small (consistently less than 1.5%) the
confidence bars are not visible on the graphs.
The input image sizes for CelebA, CIFAR-100, UTKFace.
and MNIST are 224×224×3, 32×32×3, 32×32×3, and
32×32, respectively. In addition, in our experiments, the
inputs are all normalized to 1. In all of the experiments, we
add the perturbations directly to the input image and create a
noisy representation (similar to those in Figure 1) which we
then be given to the neural network. Therefore, the function f
defined in Section 2.1 is the identity function and the sensitiv-
ity ∆f is 1. The experiments are all carried out using Python
3.6 and PyTorch 1.3.1. We use Adam optimizer (Kingma &
Ba, 2015) for perturbation training. The mutual information
numbers reported in this section are estimated over the
test set using the Shannon Mutual Information estimator
provided by the Python ITE toolbox (Szabo´, 2014).
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Figure 2. Accuracy loss vs. the privacy budget () for the four benchmark datasets, measured on test set. Basic - No Training represents the
results of adding random differentially-private perturbation. Training Purturbations shows the effect of training the perturbation distribution
parameters. The neural network parameters remain frozen at all times. The gaps shown with vertical arrows indicate the improvement
in accuracy brought by Cloak’s perturbation training for a given .
Code and more information about the model architectures,
mutual information estimation, the hyper-parameters used in
each of the experiments, and experimental setup is provided
in the supplementary material.
In the rest of this section, first, we cover the experiments
that show, in detail, how different parts of the formulation
contribute to utility and privacy. After that, we present an
experiment to show how Cloak is performing in protecting
sensitive features from malevolent classifier that tries to infer
sensitive information from the input.
4.1. Effects of Learning Perturbations
Figure 2 shows the mean accuracy loss for a given privacy
budget . Two methods are compared here. First, the Basic
- No Training method that we consider as the baseline in
which perturbation elements (the noise for each pixel) are
independently generated from a Laplace distribution with lo-
cation of zero and scale of ∆f .
∆f
 is the minimum scale that
the perturbation distributions can have, in order to achieve a
certain privacy budget of  for the feature-differential privacy
criterion of Section 3.1.
For the second method, Cloak is used to observe the effect
of perturbation distribution training on the accuracy. To
do so we removed the mutual information term from
Equation 4. The trainable parameters are only the locations
and scales (tensors M and B from Section 3) of perturbation
distributions. This means that the number of trainable
parameters are 2× input feature dimensions, and the
rest of the neural network parameters are frozen.
We observe that the scales (B) of the perturbation elements do
not change during training, since Cloak is only optimizing for
accuracy and is not trying to decrease the mutual information.
So, the scales remain at their ∆f value that delivers the
-feature differential privacy guarantee. This implies that the
improvement over the No Training method is merely caused
by the training of the elements of the locations tensor. The
vertical arrows in the graphs indicate the amount of accuracy
improvement achieved through the perturbation training. For
a budgets  of less than 0.25, the amount of noise is so high
that the perturbation training can only modestly mitigate the
situation and all the methods yield similar results. Figure 2
is depicted for  below 5, to zoom into the region of interest
and show the details. We have included graphs with  of up
to 10 in the supplementary materials.
4.2. Effects of Mutual Information Term
Figure 3 shows the accuracy loss vs. the remnant mutual
information in the original image. Remnant mutual
information denotes the mutual information between the
original image and its noisy representation, divided by the
amount of information in bits in the original image. For the
With MI Term method, the λ in Equation 4 is tuned, so that
as the accuracy grows, the mutual information in the original
images would degrade. The privacy budget is =2.5 for all
the points depicted for this method, since the mutual infor-
mation degradation does not violate the differential privacy
guarantee by pushing any scale below ∆f (Section 3.2).
The Budget Tightening method shows how much accuracy
loss would be incurred, if the same level of mutual infor-
mation is to be achieved through merely tightening the
differential privacy guarantee, using Cloak without the MI
term (−log(B)), similar to the training method of the pre-
vious section. The graphs show that using the MI term helps
achieve a certain level of mutual information with less dam-
age to model utility. The vertical arrows show the difference
in utility (accuracy) for these two methods. The worse utility
brought by naı¨vly tightening the differential privacy budget is
because DP tries to make all the features in the image similar,
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Figure 3. Accuracy loss vs. the remaining mutual information for a fixed differential-privacy budget of = 2.5. The Budget Tightening
method degrades the accuracy more for a given remnant mutual information level. The With MI Term method exploits the mutual information
term in the loss to reach the desired mutual information level, without tightening the differential privacy guarantee by reducing . The
gaps shown by the vertical arrows indicates the difference in utility of these approaches for a given level of mutual information reduction.
and adds perturbations with the same scale to all the pixels.
For both cases, the graphs show a trade-off between accuracy
and the loss in mutual information. For CIFAR-100, since
the task is classifying the 20 superclasses, there is inherently
more need for information for classification, compared to the
other benchmarks. Therefore, for a given level of accuracy
loss, the information content cannot be decreased as much
as it can in the other benchmarks. We do not present any
numerical results for the CelebA dataset here, since the
input images have an extremely large number of features
and the mutual information estimator tool is not capable of
estimating the mutual information.
4.3. Malevolent Setting to Infer Private Information
To evaluate the obfuscation that Cloak provides, we devise
an experiment in which a malevolent party tries to infer
a sensitive private label from an input that is sent to an
inference service. To this end, we use CelebA dataset and use
gender as the sensitive label while the inference service is set
to detect smiles from the perturbed inputs. Cloak does not
access to the private labels while learning the perturbations,
and it only optimizes for the accuracy of the smile detection
task, and decreasing the mutual information.
Figure 4 shows the results of this experiment. The malevolent
party is assumed to have a pre-trained VGG-16 neural
network for gender classification, that has an accuracy of
96.7% on the test set, shown by the Gender Classification
Baseline line. Cloak trains perturbation parameters with
= 2.5, but with different levels of inter-element intensity,
i.e., it uses mutual information term, similar to the ones
depicted in Figure 1. The Noisy Gender Classification de-
picts the accuracy achieved by the malevolent party’s neural
network, when it receives the perturbed representations (of
the test set) and runs inference on them. The Noisy Gender
Classification with Re-training depicts the same accuracy,
but when the malevolent neural network is re-trained using
the perturbed representations of the training dataset.
We first assume a malevolent party that would re-train its en-
tire neural network (mark all parameters as trainable), but it
would not learn anything. We then assume a malevolent party
that would limit the training to the last fully connected layer,
which yielded the results seen under the Noisy Gender Classi-
fication with Re-training. We believe the reason that limiting
the number of parameters is helpful is that it limits the fluctu-
ations in the network, by fixing a huge portion of the model
parameters. The last line in the Figure is the accuracy that a
random predictor would provide, which is 50%. For smile
detection with accuracy of 86.9%, the gender classifier suf-
fers an accuracy loss of 30.7% and does 15.8% better than a
random classifier. The drop in gender classification accuracy,
and the disability in learning and gaining higher accuracy
is caused by the perturbation obfuscating unrelated features.
However, since the nonsensitive task is smile detection, there
could be some features that both gender detection and smile
detection rely on (like the mouth area). This means it might
not be possible to completely remove gender information
while still maintaining smile detection accuracy.
5. Related Work
Privacy preserving research can be broadly categorized along
two dimensions: first, the phase on which they focus, i.e.,
training vs inference, and second, the method that they use,
i.e., perturbation-based vs cryptography-based. The majority
of these studies fall under the training category where they try
to protect users’ privacy whiling building ML models (Shokri
& Shmatikov, 2015; Abadi et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2013;
Chaudhuri et al., 2009; 2013) or aggregating/publishing
detests (Dwork et al., 2006b;a; Dwork & Roth, 2014).
However, the impending importance of inference privacy
has led to the emergence of recent research efforts in this
direction (Osia et al., 2020; Osia et al., 2020; Wang et al.,
2018; Dowlin et al., 2016; Leroux et al., 2018). These
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Figure 4. Cloak learns perturbations for the inference service of
smile detection on CelebA dataset with 4.9% degradation to the
accuracy of this service. If a malevolent party attempts to use
the same perturbed image to infer sensitive (private) information,
e.g. gender, the performance of this new inference service will be
degraded by at least 31% while originally the accuracy was 96.7%.
This shows Cloak is protecting the user against malicious use of
their private information.
methods, unlike Cloak, either use homomorphic encryption
that suffers from prohibitive computational costs (Dowlin
et al., 2016), need labels for private information (Osia et al.,
2020), or require significant changes/retraining in model
architecture/weights (Wang et al., 2018). Additionally, in
contrast to Cloak, these efforts do not formulate the problem
as a direct analytical function of the perturbations that can
be optimized using gradient descent. Below, the most related
works are discussed in more details.
5.1. Noise-based Privacy Protection
For training, the literature abounds with the studies that
use noise addition as a randomization mechanism to protect
privacy (Chaudhuri et al., 2013; Dwork & Roth, 2014). Most
notably, differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b), a mathe-
matical framework that quantifies privacy, has spawned a vast
body of research in noise-adding mechanisms. For instance,
it has been applied to many machine learning algorithms,
such as logistic regression (Chaudhuri & Monteleoni, 2009),
statistical risk minimization (Chaudhuri et al., 2009), princi-
pal component analysis (Jiang et al., 2013; Chaudhuri et al.,
2013), and deep learning (Shokri & Shmatikov, 2015; Abadi
et al., 2016), to name a few. Nearly all of these studies have
applied differential privacy to a training setting where they
mainly concern with leaking private information in training
set through the machine learning model. This paper, however,
offers a differential private mechanism for DNN inference.
Only a handful of studies have addressed privacy of inference
by adding noise to the data. Osia et al. (Osia et al., 2020)
employed dimensionality reduction techniques such as
principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the amount
of information before sending to untrusted cloud. Wang et
al. (Wang et al., 2018) propose a noise injection framework
that randomly nullifies input elements for private inference,
but their method requires retraining of the entire network.
Leroux et al. (Leroux et al., 2018) propose an autoencoder
to randomize the data, but the intensity of their obfuscation
is too small to be irreversible, as they state. In a recent
work (Author, 2020), we propose , to heuristically learn
multiplicative and additive noise patterns by repeatedly
collecting feasible patterns and fitting a distribution to them.
In contrast, we formulate the problem of learning the distribu-
tion of the noise as a convex optimization that is directly and
optimally solved through stochastic gradient descent. Due
to the heuristic and pattern-based nature of this prior work,
it cannot provide formal proofs nor does it satisfies the differ-
ential privacy criterion. More importantly, a significant part
of its mutual information reduction comes from executing
parts of the network on the edge side and sending the results
to the cloud. However, this separation is not always possible,
as the service providers might not be willing to share the
model parameters or the edge device cannot run the compute
heavy beginning convolution layers of the neural network.
5.2. Cryptographic-based Privacy Protection
Privacy on offloaded computation can be provided by the
means of cryptographic tools such as homomorphic encryp-
tion and/or Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). Ho-
momorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009; Bos et al., 2013) is a
cyrptographic technique that allows deep learning operations
to be performed in an encrypted domain (Dowlin et al., 2016).
As such, there is no need for decryption, enabling the user
to send ecrypted data to untrusted cloud without sharing the
cryptographic key. However, these approaches suffer from
a prohibitive computational costs, on both cloud and user
side, exacerbating the complexity and compute-intensivity
of neural networks especially on resource-constrained edge
devices. Cloak in contrast avoids the significant cost of
encryption and homomorphoic data processing.
Several other research (Tramer & Boneh, 2019; Hanzlik
et al., 2018) rely on trusted execution environments such
as Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone to run machine learning
algorithm in remote hosts. However, this model requires
the users to send their data to an enclave running on remote
servers. In contrast to Cloak, this model still allows the
remote server to have access to the raw data and as the new
breaches in hardware (Kocher et al., 2019; Lipp et al., 2018)
show, the access can lead to comprised privacy.
6. Conclusion
The surge in the use of machine learning is due to the
growth in data and compute. The data mostly comes
from people (Thompson & Warzel, 2019) and includes an
abundance of sensitive information. We propose Cloak, a
mechanism that learns differentially-private stochasticities
that can help preserve privacy by obfuscating sensitive
information in the raw input data while maintaining accuracy
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for the intended inference in deep neural networks.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Formal Problem Representation
Deep Neural Network: Consider a deterministic pre-
processing function f(D) that operates on the input tensor
data D. We can model a DNN by a deterministic function
g(f(D);θ∗), where, f(D) is the tensor of pre-processed in-
put data and θ∗ is the fixed optimized parameter that fully
determines the function g (and maximizes its utility over
the distribution of the input tensor). We assume the DNN is
trained and the parameter θ∗ remains the same throughout
the process. As such, for the ease of the notation, we might
drop the parameter θ∗.
Performance: SupposeLnn(D,g(f(D);θ) is a loss function
such that
θ∗∈argmin
θ
Lnn(D,g(f(D);θ))
If Lnn is the loss function corresponding to the DNN, then
we are assuming that the network is trained and θ∗ is the
optimal parameter.
Privacy: We define the privacy P as the negative of the
mutual information between the input of the function g and
the raw data D, i.e.,
P =−I(D;f(D))
where I(·;·) represents mutual information. The lower mu-
tual information implies higher privacy. Since f is a deter-
ministic function, we have
P =−H(f(D))+H(f(D)∣∣D)=−H(f(D)) (6)
whereH(·) denotes the entropy function.
Noise Injection: Denote a perturbation tensor by X which is
independent of D. We intend to perturb the input to function
g by changing f(D) to f(D)+X, i.e., the output of function
g changes from g(f(D);θ∗) to g(f(D)+X;θ∗). It is worth
reemphasizing that the parameter θ∗ remains unchanged.
Now, we need to change the privacy measure P to Pˆ where
Pˆ = −I(D;g(f(D)+X)). We can provide the following
lower bound
Pˆ =−I(D;f(D)+X)
≥−I(f(D);f(D)+X)
=−H(f(D))+H(f(D)∣∣f(D)+X)
=P+H(f(D)∣∣f(D)+X)
(7)
where the last equality is derived from (6). This equation
implies that by noise injection process, we can improve the
privacy at least byH(f(D)∣∣f(D)+X).
Optimization Problem: After noise injection, we would
like to find the optimal perturbation X∗ that maximizes the
privacy while keeping the performance at an admissible error
range. In other words, we are looking for the solution to the
following optimization problem
X∗=argmax
X
Pˆ s.t. Lnn(D,g(f(D)+X;θ∗))≤γ
Given (7), we use I (f(D);f(D)+X) = H(f(D) + X) −
H(f(D)+X∣∣f(D))=H(f(D)+X)−H(X)) as a surrogate
objective and reformulate the problem in terms of a Lagrange
multiplier λ as
X∗=argmin
X
H(f(D)+X)−H(X))
+λLnn(D,g(f(D)+X;θ∗))
(8)
where the dual parameter λ is to be determined via cross
validation on the generalization error.
Remark A.1. Optimization problem (8) has three terms.
The first term controls the amount of information that leaks
to the DNN and we want to minimize this information. The
second term controls the amount of uncertainty that we are
injecting in the form of independently sampled noise. This
term is typically proportional to the variance of the noise and
we want this term to be maximized (and hence the negative
sign). The last term controls the amount of degradation in
the performance of the DNN and we want to minimize that
with respect to the knob λ.
Remark A.2. The loss function Lnn(·) is determined
at the training time of the DNN to obtain the optimal
parameter θ∗. The loss function for a regression problem
can be a Lebesgue Lp-norm and for a q-class classi-
fication problem with Z = g(f(D) + X; θ∗), it can be
Lnn(D,Z)=−
∑q
j=11X∈Cj log(Zj) where 1· is the indicator
function, Cj represents the jth class and Zj is the jth logit
representing the probability thatD∈Cj . Suppose 1D is a one-
hot-encoded q-vector with jth element being 1 if D∈Cj and
the rest are zero. We then can write the classification loss in
vector form asLnn(D,Z)=−1TXlog(Z). For the remainder of
this paper, we target a q-class classification and rewrite (8) as
X∗=argmin
X
H(f(D)+X)−H(X)
+λ1TXlog
(
g(f(D)+X;θ∗)
) (9)
Remark A.3. Assuming X is element-wise distributed as
Lap(M,B), we can establish that the first and second term
in (9) are proportional to log(B) and rewrite the optimization
problem as
(M∗,B∗)=argmin
M,B
−log(B)
+λEX∼Lap(M,B)
[
1TXlog
(
g(f(D)+X;θ∗)
)]
(10)
where E[·] represents the expectation that can be approx-
imated via Monte Carlo sampling of X. Solving this
optimization problem, we get the optimal noise distribution
parameters.
Inference: In order to do the inference, we generate a noise
tensor X drawn from the distribution we learned in (10), and
add it to the output of function f before sending it to the
server.
Guarantee: The optimization problem (10) guarantees that
for a given value of the knob λ, one can find the distribution
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Figure 5. Accuracy loss vs. the privacy budget () for the four benchmark datasets, measured on test set, for privacy budget( of up to 10).
Basic -No Training represents the results of adding random differentially-private perturbation. Training Purturbations shows the effect
of training the perturbation distribution parameters. The rest of the neural network remains frozen at all times. The gaps shown with vertical
arrows indicate the improvement in accuracy brought by Cloak’s perturbation training for a given .
Table 1. Neural networks used in experiments of Section 4.
Neural Network Conv Layers FC Layers Dataset
VGG-16 13 3 CelebA
AlexNet 5 3 CIFAR-100
LeNet-5 13 3 MNIST
VGG-16 (modified) 3 2 UTKFace
parameters that minimizes the information sent to the cloud,
while preserving the quality of the service. Since this opti-
mization problem is convex, we are guaranteed to converge
to the optimal point via gradient descent algorithm. That is
why Cloak uses this optimization technique.
A.2. Detailed Experimental Setup
A.2.1. EXPERIMENTATION HARDWARE AND OS
We have run the experiments for CelebA and CIFAR-100
datasets on an Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti GPU, with 11GB VRAM,
paired with 10 Intel Core i9-9820X processors with 64GBs
of memory. The experiments for MNIST and UTKFace
datasets were run on the CPU. The systems runs an Ubuntu
18.04 OS, with CUDA version V10.2.89.
A.2.2. NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
Table 1 shows the DNNs used for the experiments. The code
for all the models is available in the supplementary materials.
The modified VGG-16 is different from the conventional
one in the size of the last 3 fully connected layers. They are
(512,256), (256,256) and (256,2).
A.2.3. MUTUAL INFORMATION ESTIMATION
As mentioned in Section 4, the mutual information between
the input images and their noisy representations are estimated
over the test set images using ITE (Szabo´, 2014) toolbox’s
Shannon mutual information estimator. For MNIST images,
our dataset had inputs of size 32 × 32 pixels, which we
flattened to 1024 element vectors, for estimating the mutual
information. For other datasets, since the images were larger
(32×32×3), there were more dimensions and mutual infor-
mation estimation was not accurate. So, what we did here
was calculate mutual information channel by channel (i.e. we
estimated the mutual information between the red channel
of the image and its noisy representation, then the green
channel and then blue), and we averaged over all channels.
The numbers reported in 4.2 are remnant mutual information
percentages, which means the remaining mutual information
is divided by the information content in the original
images. This information content was estimated using self-
information (Shannon information), using the same toolbox.
A.2.4. HYPERPARAMETERS FOR TRAINING
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the hyperparameters used for training
in the experiments of Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
For the last two, the Point# indicates the experiment that
produced the given point in the graph, if the points were
numbered from left to right. The hyperparameters of the
experiment in Figure 1 are same as the ones for experiment in
Section 4.3, which is in Table 4. In our implementation, for
ease of use and without loss of generality, we have introduced
a variable γ to the loss function in Equation 4, in a way that
γ= 1λ , and it is the coefficient of the mutual information term,
not the cross-entropy loss. With this introduction, we do not
directly assign a λ (as if λwere removed and replaced by γ
as a coefficient of the other term) and we need not set λ very
high when we want to remove the mutual information term.
We just set γ to zero. In the tables, we have used lambda to be
consistent, and in the cells where the value for λ is not given,
it means that the mutual information term was not used. But
in the Code, the coefficient is set on the other term and is
1/λs reported here. The batch sizes used for training are 128
for CIFAR-100, MNIST and UTKFace and 40 for CelebA.
For testing, as mentioned in the text of Section 4, the batch
size is 1, so as to sample a new noise tensor for each image
and capture the stochasticity. Also, the number of samples
taken for each update in optimization is 1, as mentioned in
Section 3.4, since we do mini-batch training and for each
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mini-batch we take a new sample. Finally,Mx is set to 2.0 for
all benchmarks, except for MNIST where it is set to be 1.5.
A.3. Code Directory Structure
The Code.zip is available in the supplementary material.
Also, the saved models and numpy files are available at the
link http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3665794.
Both theCode.zip and thesaved models npys.zip
which is provided at the link have the same structure. They
each contain 3 Folders named Experiment1, Experiment2
and Experiment3-celeba which are related to Sections 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Within each experiment folder,
there are 4 folders that correspond to the 4 datasets and
the code is provided for each dataset in the related folder.
Also, the pre-trained parameters needed are provided in
the saved models npys.zip, in the corresponding
directory. So, all that is needed to be done is to copy all
files from the saved models npys.zip directory to
their corresponding positions in the Code folder, and then
run the provided Jupyter notebooks. For CelebA dataset,
as mentioned, the experiment in Section 4.2 is carried out
by visualizations. Therefore, the visualization notebook is
provided with some sample images saved in it. For the other
datasets, however, the noisy and original representations
are provided (in .npy format), along with the script used
to estimate mutual information. Also, the notebook that
was used to generate those representations is provided, in
case someone wants to reproduce the results, and the saved
(noise-trained) and pre-trained models are given as well.
For acquiring the datasets, you can have a look at the
acquire datasets.ipynb notebook, included in the
Code.zip.
In short, each notebook within the Experiment1 and 2
folders that has train in its name will start by loading the
required datasets and then creating a model. Then, the
model is trained based on the experiments and using the
hyperparameters provided in section A.2.4. Finally, you
can run a test function that is provided to evaluate the model.
For Experiment2, at the end of the training notebooks
there is also an script that generates the original and noisy
representations for mutual information estimation. For
seeing how the mutual information is estimated, you can
run the notebooks that have mutual info in their names.
You need not have run the training before hand, if you place
the provided .npy files in the correct directories. For the
mutual information estimation you will need to download the
ITE toolbox (Szabo´, 2014). The link is provided in the code.
A.4. Section 4.1 results with broader  range
Figure 5 re-illustates Figure 2 in Section 4.1, with a wider
privacy budget of up to 10. It can be seen that for most
benchmarks, for privacy budgets larger than 5, since the
amount of injected noise is less, the accuracy loss is less
and the training the perturbation parameters makes a more
moderate improvement.
Table 2. Hyperparameters for Section 4.1 experiments.
Dataset Epsilon Details
CelebA
10.00 0.3 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
5.00 0.3 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.3 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2.50 0.3 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.3 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2.00 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 1 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
1.52 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 1 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
1.00 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
0.50 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
0.25 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
CIFAR-100
10.00 1 epoch w/ lr= 0.00001
5.00
1 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.001,     
3 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
2.50
9 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr= 0.001,   
3 epoch w/ lr =0.0001
2.00 20 epoch w/ lr=0.000001
1.52 20 epoch w/ lr=0.000001
1.00 20 epoch w/ lr=0.000001
0.50 20 epoch w/ lr=0.000001
0.25 20 epoch w/ lr=0.000001
MNIST
10.00 20 epoch w/ lr=0.001
5.00 20 epoch w/ lr=0.001
2.50 30 epoch w/ lr=0.001, 25 w/ lr=0.0001
2.00 20 epoch w/ lr=0.001, 32 w/ lr=0.0001
1.52 30 epoch w/ lr=0.001, 25 w/ lr=0.0001
1.00 30 epoch w/ lr=0.001, 25 w/ lr=0.0001
0.50 10 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
0.25 10 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
UTKFace
10.00 1 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 5 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
5.00 1 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 5 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2.50 1 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 8 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2.00 6 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
1.52 6 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
1.00 6 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
0.50 12 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
0.25 12 epoch w/ lr= 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
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Table 3. Hyperparameters for Section 4.2 experiments.
Dataset Point# Details
CIFAR-100 
1
6 epoch w/ lr=0.001 6, 14 epoch w/ lr= 
0.00001
2
10 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda =10
3
10 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
4
12 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
5
17 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 3 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
6
24 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
7
30 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 1, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
8
40 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 0.2, 2 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
9
140 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 0.2, 2 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 10
MNIST 
10
300 epoch w/ lr= 0.001 lambda = 0.01, 20 
epoch w/ lr=0.0001 lambda = 10
1
25 epoch w/ lr =0.001, 30 epoch w/ 
lr=0.0001
2
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 40 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 1000
3
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 50 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 1000
4
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 60 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 200
5
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 90 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 200
6
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 160 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 200
7
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 180 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 200
8
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 260 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 100
9
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 290 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 100
10
50 epoch w/ lr= 0.01 lambda = 100, 300 
epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda = 100
UTKFace
1 6 epoch w/ lr = 0.01, 6 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2
4 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=0.1, 2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.0001 lambda = 100
3
8 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=0.1, 2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.0001 lambda = 100
4
10 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=0.1, 2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.0001 lambda = 100
5
12 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=0.1, 2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.0001 lambda = 100
Table 4. Hyperparameters for Section 4.3 experiments.
Task Point# Details
Gender 
Classification
1 1 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
2 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001
3 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 1 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
4 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 1 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
5 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 1 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
6 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 3 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
7 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
8 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 2 epoch w/ lr=0.0001, 3 epoch w/ lr=0.00001
Smile 
Detection
1 1 epoch w/ lr=0.01, 0.1 epoch w/ lr=0.001
2 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.2 epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1
3 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.4 epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1
4 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1
5 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.7 epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1
6 0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.8 epoch w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1
7
0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.8 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1, 0.2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.001 lambda=5
8
0.5 epoch w/ lr=0.01 lambda=1, 0.8 epoch 
w/ lr=0.001 lambda=1, 0.2 epoch w/ 
lr=0.001 lambda=100
